雙35的空戰比較
中國決定買入SU-35S之後，關於Su-35S的討論又多起來。俄羅斯聲稱Su-35S為「四代加加加」戰鬥機，性能上是足以完勝任何四代或四代加的戰鬥機。由於某國的宣傳給力並且「拉伙入幫」的能力天下無雙，某架怎樣計也算不上是由「自己」早先定義的「五代機」，經鋪天蓋地宣傳和一些早年慘遭拉入所謂的「共同研發、優先購買」的國家「自我暗示」下，某「體形過胖」的「攻擊機」被洗白成「空優無敵」的先進戰鬥機。此兩機都是代號「35」的打起上來誰勝誰負？以下文章倒可反映一些不在「主流媒體」出現的觀點...
Source: Air Power Australia
Original Title: How? The Deadly Question for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
The depicted Su-35S is expected to be the last Flanker variant to be mass produced before the PAK-FA enters full rate production (KnAAPO image).
How will the intended 2,443 F-35s JSF impose air dominance for the USA and its Allies? That is the question to ask.
Search the Internet for material on the JSF and you will find terabyte after terabyte of articles, pictures, Powerpoint presentations, PDFs, tables and laudatory Blogs. And how much relates to how the JSF will deliver this capability? You will find assertions and statement such as ‘six times better Relative Loss Exchange Ratio than legacy aircraft’ , or ‘The operational arguments focus on combat effectiveness against top foreign fighter aircraft such as the Russian Su-27 and MiG-29. Lockheed Martin and USAF analysts put the loss-exchange ratio at 30-1 for the F-22, 3-1 for the F-35 and 1-1 or less for the F-15, F/A-18 and F-16’.
And how will the F-35 JSF perform, not against truly obsolete legacy aircraft like the Su-27SK and the MiG-29, but against modern fighters like the Su-35S? We can answer these questions with a head-to-head analysis of the two aircraft.
Air combat is a complex mix of art, science and engineering. Aircraft performance, weapons performance, networked sensors and pilot skill all contribute to the final Loss Exchange Ratio (LER). The only simplification is that aircraft approach, engage in combat and the survivors depart. This activity can be examined in a ‘kill-chain’ with the following stages: ‘Detect-Identify-Engage-Disengage-Destroy’ (DIED2).
Here is a scenario. In the ‘Blue’ corner, we have a flight of four F-35A JSFs, each armed with four AIM-120D Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles and the 25 mm GD ATP GAU-22/A cannon. No additional weapons or fuel are carried, because these would compromise the JSFs' “low observability” to X-Band radar. In the ‘Red’ corner, we have a flight of four Su-35S, each armed with four RVV-SD Active Radar Seeker BVR Missiles, four RVV-SD Infra-Red (IR) Seeker BVR missiles, two RVV-MD Within Visual Range (WVR) missiles, the 30mm GSh-301 cannon, KNIRTI SAP-518 jammers on the wingtips and a 6,000 litre conformal tank between the engines. Each aircraft has the full range of sensors and countermeasures.
Here is a table to show how they compare:
Figure 1: Diversity in missile airframes and seekers. A Western pilot must be proficient in evasion tactics for no less than six different families of BVR missile airframes, and four different categories of missile seeker. The endgame radiofrequency and optical countermeasures suites in a Western airframe must be effective against seven different families of missile seeker, including variants thereof. A pilot flying a Russian or Chinese supplied fighter only needs tactics and technology to defeat the AIM-120B/C/D AMRAAM. Not included is the R-27AE Alamo with a digital variant of the RVV-SD active radar terminal seeker (Diagram © 2010 Dr Carlo Kopp).
Figure 2: A key problem for the F-35 family of aircraft is that genuine X/S-band low observability is only achieved in a relatively narrow angular sector around the nose of the aircraft. This forces the aircraft to ‘point it's nose’ at the highest threat, denying flexibility in prosecuting a missile shot, or evading multiple threats. The absence of cheek and aft radar arrays exacerbates the problem, and cannot be fixed given the weight, power and cooling problems in the basic airframe design (Diagram © 2010 Dr Carlo Kopp).
Whoa! The F-35A assessments are all marked in Red and Yellow – Inferior or Equivalent. Why is that?
Let’s look at each element of the ‘kill-chain’.
Detect:
Electronic Support Measures: Air combat aircraft emit radiation from jet engines, radar, JTIS/MIDSs terminal, radio transmissions. Specialised equipment in combat aircraft knows the frequencies of these transmissions and has sensors to detect them. Attempts are made to minimise emissions through a process of ‘Emission Control’ (EMCON) but these can only be partially successful. Both the JSF and the Su-35S have a full range of these sensors, and are assessed as being equally effective in ESM capability.
ESA Radar X-Band: This is the primary sensor for jet fighters. The radar cross section of the F-35A is substantially lower than that of the Su-35S especially in the front sector, but the Sukhoi has sufficient power and a much larger antenna to partially overcome that difference. Both types are ‘networked’ so in a multi-ship engagement, the geometrical spread of the Su-35S flight in part negates the lower observability of the JSF by illuminating the JSF from angles where its low observability is weakest. Expect the F-35A to often get the ‘first look’, but the Su-35S flight to detect the JSF outside the range of the JSFs' BVR missiles. So where it matters, the limited low observability of the JSF provides little advantage.
ESA Radar L-Band: The Su-35S will have this lower-frequency radar in its wing leading edges. The JSF is ‘stealthed’ for X-Band, not for L-Band. While the antenna size of the Su-35S L-Band radar limits its performance, there will be times when the L-Band radar detects the JSF before the X-Band radar. The JSF does not have an L-Band Radar and is assessed accordingly.
Infra-Red Search & Track: There is a different approach to Infra-Red sensors. The JSF has a superb Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (DAS) designed to cover the sphere around the aircraft, but strongly optimised for air-to-ground operations. The Su-35S has a large aperture OLS-35 IRST optimised to scan for other aircraft at long range in its area of interest. DAS is a ‘staring array’ while the OLS-35 is a ‘scanning array’. The difference in detection range is like the difference between a person searching with a naked eye compared with another searching with a telescope. If the telescope is pointed in the right direction, it will get first detection. Add to that the factor that the JSF has the hottest engine in the market, and the IRST of the Su-35S is assessed as a superior aid to air combat.
Identification: Not much need to be said here. The threat of fratricide in BVR air combat has led to the development of identification systems that will reliable separate friend from foe. Fratricide still happens though, especially in mixed, close-in fights.
Engagement:
Mach on Entry: High Mach increases the energy of BVR missiles, sending them further. The design top speed of the Su-35S is 2.25, limited by canopy and radome heating, so it has surplus power and the fuel to burn to sustain high Mach numbers. The drag of the external stores is likely to reduce this to something below Mach 2, but the missiles are cleared for launch at all speeds. The JSF has yet to demonstrate a flight above Mach 1.05, but even if it reaches its design speed of Mach 1.6, it is clearly inferior.
Altitude on Entry: Like Mach, a higher altitude adds potential energy to BVR missiles, sending them further, while an enemy’s missiles must ‘climb the hill,’ severely reducing range. A second factor is that missiles fired from a higher altitude have less drag, again increasing range. The JSF is optimised for Strike missions flown at about 15-25,000 feet, while the Su-35S is optimised for air combat missions at about 40,000 feet and above, with a combat ceiling close to 60,000 feet. Points go to the Su-35S on operating altitude.
Missile Range: The RVV-SD and the AIM-120D have roughly equivalent ranges, but when the RVV-SD has a high-Mach, high-altitude launch; it will outrange the AIM-120D. The Su-35S is assessed at delivering a longer BVR engagement range. This area of superiority will be increased once the RVV-AE-PD ramjet missile becomes operational. In addition, the Su-35S can carry the very long range R-37 and R-172 missiles, with ranges to 200 nautical miles.
Missile Seeker Diversity: The AIM-120D currently has an active radar seeker, while the RVV-SD/R-77ME and the R-77TE have active and infra-Red (IIR) seekers respectively. Mixed sensor seekers complicate defences, for example, the F-35 may turn to defeat an active seeker and expose a hot part of the aircraft to an IR seeker. Russian doctrine is to ‘pair’ missiles with an active seeker followed by a IR seeker, creating diversity in the fight and creating ‘kill’ opportunities. The Russian missiles also have the option of passive anti-radiation seekers, designed to home on X-band radar. This diversity in missile seeker sensors gives an advantage to the Su-35S.
Signature Exposure: This is a factor that primarily affects the JSF, known to have a ‘Pacman’ radar cross-section at X-Band, with a Low Observability ‘notch’ at the front. As it manoeuvres, it can turn the notch away from an aircraft searching sensor, and expose a higher radar cross-section to that search, or expose a broadside or rear-side to another aircraft. The F-35 relying on a ‘can’t see me, can’t kill me’ capability, has more to lose in a spread, manoeuvring engagement than the Su-35S, which will generally be detectable by the JSF for most of the engagement. This exposure can occur, for example, when the JSF is guiding a missile and turns away to reduce the closure rate, thereby exposing both the aircraft and an incoming missile to longer range detection, or detection from a widely spaced wingman. As the JSF is reliant on signature reduction for survival, it has more to lose if its signature increases, so is assessed as more vulnerable in the dynamics of a multi-ship, networked, turning engagement where signature management is very difficult.
Endgame Electronic Countermeasures (ECM): The ‘modus operandi’ of stealth aircraft is not to radiate, or return radiation, which is the way ECM countermeasures work. Su-35S has ECM, JSF does not, except for intended AESA Radar jamming modes across a limited forward cone of about 120 degrees. ECM based on Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) can be very effective, especially against missiles with limited processing power and time to resolve targets. The Su-35S also has several ECM modes. The JSF is assessed as inferior, because it does not employ ECM to defeat attack.
Decoys Towed / Fired: The Su-35S has the option of deploying towed decoys to lure a closing missile away from the body of the aircraft. The JSF approach is different, with small ‘Gen-X’ active decoys being fired as a missile closes. These measures are assessed as being approximately equivalent, with the towed decoys which are at co-speed to the target likely to present the more effective countermeasure.
Flares and Chaff: These are outmoded countermeasures, but still add to the difficulty of guiding a missile to close proximity of an airframe. The GSh-301 is claimed to have rounds that fire chaff forward of the aircraft, so chaff-discrimination processing in a closing missile might be deceived. Nonetheless, the countermeasures are assessed as equivalent.
Mach for a Tail-Chase / Fuel Reserves for Afterburner: At some time in a fight, an aircraft has to depart, for example when ‘Winchester’ or out of ammunition, or ‘Bingo’ or down to just enough fuel to get home. Then the fight becomes a tail-chase. The Su-35S with its higher Mach can close on a JSF, the reverse is not the case. The ability of the Su-35S to carry large fuel loads, and the prodigious consumption of the JSF F135 engine in maximum afterburner exacerbates this perilous situation for the JSF. The advantage is with the Su-35S in these aspects of engaging in a fight when the JSF is attempting to disengage.
Disengagement: This is one of the under-assessed areas of future air combat. When missiles of roughly equivalent range are fired, they travel for over 100 seconds to the target. This transit time provides an opportunity for countermeasures to defeat the attack. Missile motor launch-flares are intensive and difficult to hide from Infra-Red sensors, so in many engagements, there will be early warning of an incoming missile. Active seekers ‘light-up’ at about 10 nautical miles from the target, still providing valuable warning time. Here is a range of disengagement measures:
Airframe Agility: Once warned of a launch, the defending aircraft can sometimes defeat the attack by rapidly turning away to force the missile into a tail-chase.
Antenna Coverage: AESA radars like the JSF APG-81 working from a fixed back-plate cover a cone of about 120 degrees. The Su-35S has an ESA radar working from a gimballed ‘swash-plate’ that covers about 240 degrees around the nose, and there is a second radar in the ‘stinger’ albeit with less capability, to cover the remainder of the sphere. If the Su-35S and the JSF fire a BVR missile at the same time and at maximum range, the Su-35S can turn away to about 120 degrees off the line joining the two aircraft, while the JSF is constrained to about 60 degrees. This runs the JSF into the Su-35S’s missile, while the Su-35S is running away from the JSF’s missile. The result could be an RVV-SD hit and an AIM-120 miss. Points to the Su-35S on this aspect.
Mach on Egress / Fuel Reserves for Afterburner: This is an extension of the antenna coverage capability, as the Su-35S can accelerate away from the incoming missile, forcing it to drop-short. The JSF does not have this performance and is assessed as inferior.
Destroy:
Missile Seeker Diversity: At terminal phases of an engagement, there may be several missiles in the vicinity, with aircraft manoeuvring to defeat the attack. An incoming missile with an IR seeker may be presented with the ‘rear end’ of a JSF and track for a kill. This opportunity is not available to the JSF attacking the Su-35S, as its limited missile carriage does not include BVR missiles with IR seekers.
Missile Agility: This is the ‘flip side’ of aircraft agility. The R-77 has the famous ‘potato masher’ lattice-tail control surfaces, that while increasing drag over conventional surfaces, also give greater terminal manoeuvring capability. So, the Su-35S BVR weapons can out-turn the F-35’s weapons.
Warhead Lethality: This is a mix of warhead destructive power and the vulnerability of the target airframe. The AIM-120D has an 18 Kg, fragmentation warhead, and the Su-35S widely spaced armoured engines, armoured sections of the airframe and redundancy of system. The R-77 missiles have 30 kg expanding-rod warheads to destroy the single-engine JSF, from which critical systems like fire suppression have been removed to reduce weight and cost. The Su-35S is assessed as superior.
WVR Missiles: This is as simple as ‘the Su-35S carries WVR missiles, the JSF does not’ (in this example). The JSF can carry WVR missiles, but they are an external mount, impairing radar signatures.
Guns Lethality: Bigger is better. 30 mm rounds have more explosive power than 25 mm rounds. Again, the airframe vulnerability is an issue and a single 30 mm hit to the JSF’s single engine could bring it down.
At the end of the kill-chain, it seems, prima facie, that the Su-35S has all the ‘right stuff’ for air combat, while the F-35 JSF does not. This should come as no surprise, because the design brief for the JSF was that the F-22A would ‘sanitise’ airspace and deliver air dominance, making it safe for the Joint STRIKE Fighter to deliver follow-up strike capabilities.
Now that the F-22A Raptor program is being terminated with insufficient aircraft to deliver air dominance, this role is now being assigned to the F-35 JSF.
Given the intent of the OSD to employ the F-35 Joint Strike fighter as an air dominance fighter, the fundamental and unanswered question is:
Postscript: Please don’t mention the PAK-FA.
...<div class='locked'><em>瀏覽完整內容，請先 <a href='member.php?mod=register'>註冊</a> 或 <a href='javascript:;' onclick="lsSubmit()">登入會員</a></em></div><div></div> 看不懂英文
所以不評論 SU-35S 跟 F-35 不在同一量級，F-35強調隱身能力絕對不會跟SU-35S纏鬥也不需要，SU-35S跟韓版是F-15SK同一量級還低於F-15SE沉默鷹。{:40:} F35在隱身上和電子能力上是很有優勢的 SU35只能在機動能力上占優勢 悲衰的羅生門 發表於 2013-4-3 11:00 PM static/image/common/back.gif
F35在隱身上和電子能力上是很有優勢的 SU35只能在機動能力上占優勢
是嗎？文中可是比較兩機的各種各樣，例如鎗炮口徑(25mm vs 30mm)、各類的中距彈格鬥彈的射程，甚至電子干擾能力、油箱大小(可用多久的後燃)、L-Band雷達(補充一下缺乏隱身的不利因素)等。...<div class='locked'><em>瀏覽完整內容，請先 <a href='member.php?mod=register'>註冊</a> 或 <a href='javascript:;' onclick="lsSubmit()">登入會員</a></em></div><br><br><br><br><br><div></div> 其實我個人比較看好SU-35,就算F-35有隱形,但能力被限制一大堆,價格又是天價,後勤妥善率應該也會像F-22低,相對SU-35可能比較合成本
下面是GOOGLE的英譯中， 請參考。
資料來源：澳大利亞空中力量
原標題：怎麼樣？ F-35聯合攻擊戰斗機的致命的問題
蘇-35S-KNAAPO-2P-7S.jpg
所描述的蘇-35S有望成為最后的“側衛”變種大規模生產前的PAK-FA進入全速率生產（KNAAPO圖像）。
預期的2,443架F-35 JSF將如何征收為美國及其盟國的空中優勢嗎？這是個問題要問。
在Internet上搜索材料的JSF和TB的文章，圖片，Powerpoint演示文稿，PDF格式，表格的美稱部落格后，你會發現TB的。多少涉及到，JSF將如何提供這種能力嗎？你會發現斷言和語句，如“6倍的相對虧損換股比率比傳統飛機”，或運行參數集中在對陣頂級國外如俄羅斯的蘇-27和米格-29戰斗機的戰斗力。洛克希德·馬丁公司和美國空軍分析師把損失交換比的F-22在30-1，3-1 F-35和1-1或更小的F-15，F/A-18和F-16 “。
以及如何將F-35 JSF PERFORM，而不是對真正意義上的過時的舊飛機，如蘇-27SK和米格-29，但對現代戰機，如蘇-35S？頭負責人分析認為，這兩架飛機，我們可以回答這些問題。
空戰是藝术，科學和工程的復雜組合。飛機的性能，武器的性能，網絡化傳感器和飛行員的技能都有助于最后的損失交換比（LER）。唯一的簡化是飛機的做法，從事在戰斗中的幸存者離開。在“殺鏈”，這個活動可以檢查以下几個階段：“檢測確定參與逃脫，摧毀”（DIED2）。
這是一個場景。在“藍”一角，有四個AIM-120D超視距（BVR）導彈和25毫米GD ATP GAU-22 / A大炮，我們有一個飛行的四架F-35A JSFs，各武裝。沒有額外的武器或燃料，因為這會損害JSFs“X-波段雷達低可探測性”。在“紅”的角落，我們有一個飛行的4架蘇-35S，各武裝在Visual四RVV-SD主動雷達導引頭超視距導彈，4個RVV-SD紅外線（IR）導引超視距導彈，RVV-MD范圍內（WVR）導彈，30毫米GSh-301型為大炮，KNIRTI SAP-518干擾機翼尖和一個6000升的保形油箱之間的引擎。每架飛機有全方位的傳感器和對策。
下面是一個表以顯示他們如何比較：
JSF-VS-蘇-35S-ACM.png的
BVR-AAM-多樣性1.PNG
圖1：在導彈彈体和求職者的多樣性。一位西方飛行員必須精通逃避戰术不低于6個不同的家庭的BVR導彈彈体，導彈的導引頭和四個不同的類別。對導彈的導引頭7個不同的家庭，包括它們的變体，最終的結局射頻和光電對抗西方的機身套房，必須是有效的。只需要一個一個俄羅斯或中國提供的戰斗機飛行員的戰术和技术，以擊敗的AIM-120B/C/D的先進中程空空導彈。不包括在內是用數碼變体的RVV-SD主動雷達終端導引頭（圖©2010博士卡羅柯普）的R-27AE阿拉摩。
蘇-35S-VS-JSF參與1.PNG
圖2：F-35系列飛機的一個關鍵問題是，在一個相對狹窄的角度扇區，鼻子周圍的飛機只有實現真正的X / S波段的低可探測性。這將迫使飛機，它的鼻子指向“的最高威脅，起訴導彈擊落的靈活性，否認或逃避多種威脅。臉頰和尾部雷達陣列的情況下加劇了這一問題，並不能固定重量，功耗和散熱問題的基本機身設計（圖©2010博士卡羅的科普）。
哇！ F-35A的評估都標記為紅色和黃色 - 劣質或同等學歷。這是為什麼？
讓我們來看看“殺鏈中的每個元素。
檢測：
電子支援措施：空軍的作戰飛機發出的輻射噴氣發動機，雷達，行車時間顯示系統/ MIDSs終端，無線電傳輸。特別裝備在作戰飛機的人都知道這些傳輸的頻率和傳感器探測到它們。嘗試，以減少排放量的排放控制“（EMCON）的過程，但這些只能是部分成功。 JSF和蘇-35S有一個全方位的這些傳感器，被評定為ESM能力同樣有效。
ESA雷達的X-波段：這是噴氣式戰斗機的主要傳感器。的F-35A的雷達截面基本上是低于，特別是在前面的部門的蘇-35S，，但蘇霍伊具有足夠的功率和更大的天線，以部分地克服這種差別。這兩種類型的“網絡”，因此在多船參與，几何傳播的蘇-35S的飛行部分抵消了低可觀測性照明JSF JSF從低可探測性是最弱的角度。預計F-35A往往得到的“先看看”，但檢測JSF范圍以外的JSFs“超視距導彈的蘇-35S的飛行。因此，重要的地方，把有限的低可探測性的JSF提供了小的優勢。
ESA雷達L-波段：蘇-35S都會有這樣的低頻率雷達在其機翼前緣。 JSF是“潛行”X-波段，而不是L-波段。雖然蘇-35S L-波段雷達的天線尺寸限制了它的性能，將L-波段雷達檢測的時候，JSF之前的X-波段雷達。 JSF沒有L-波段雷達和相應的評估。
紅外搜索與跟蹤：有紅外線傳感器是一種不同的方法。 JSF有一個極好的光電分布式孔徑系統（DAS），覆蓋球体周圍的飛機，但强烈空中到地面的操作進行了優化。蘇-35S擁有大光圈優化的OLS-35紅外搜索跟蹤掃描其他飛機在遠距離在其感興趣的領域。 DAS，而OLS-35是一個“掃描陣列”，“凝視陣列”。就像是在檢測范圍的不同的人之間的差異相比，與其他的搜索用望遠鏡用肉眼搜索。 ，如果望遠鏡，是指在正確的方向，它會首先檢測。的因素，JSF發動機在市場上最熱門的，IRST的蘇-35S作為一個優越的援助空戰評估。
鑒定：沒有太大必要在這里說。在超視距空戰中的威脅同室操戈，導致識別系統的發展，將可靠的獨立敵友。同室操戈雖然仍然發生，尤其是在混合的，近距離的戰斗。
參與：
馬赫輸入：馬赫的超視距導彈，把他們進一步提高能源。設計最高時速為蘇-35S是2.25，冠層和雷達天線罩加熱的限制，所以它有多余的電力和燃料燃燒來維持高馬赫數。外部存儲的阻力可能降低至低于2馬赫的東西，但在所有的速度發射的導彈將被清除。 JSF還沒有表現出上空飛行馬赫數1.05，但即使達到其設計時速為1.6馬赫，這顯然是遜色。
海拔高度上輸入：像馬赫，更高的高度上增加了潛在的能量，以超視距導彈，把他們進一步，敵人的導彈則必須“爬山”，嚴重降低了范圍。第二個因素是，從更高的高度上發射的導彈有減少阻力，再次增加的幅度。 JSF進行了優化為打擊任務飛行約15-25,000腳，而蘇-35S是在約40,000英尺以上的空中作戰任務的優化，至60,000英尺，作戰天花板。點進去的蘇-35S上運行高度。
導彈射程：RVV-SD和AIM-120D具有大致相當的范圍內，但是，當RVV-SD具有較高的馬赫，高空發射，它會超出范圍的AIM-120D。蘇-35S評估提供一個較長的“的BVR參與范圍。 RVV-AE-PD衝壓發動機的導彈開始運作后，將增加這方面的優勢。此外，蘇-35S可攜帶射程很長R-37和R-172導彈的射程為200海里。
導彈的導引頭多樣性：AIM-120D目前有主動雷達導引頭，而RVV-SD/R-77ME和R-77TE分別有積極和紅外線（IIR）求職者。例如，混合傳感器求職者的復雜的防御系統，F-35，打敗主動導引頭和暴露部分飛機的紅外導引頭的熱點。俄羅斯的學說是“配對”導彈主動導引頭的紅外導引頭，創造多樣性的斗爭中，創造'殺'的機會。俄羅斯的導彈也可以選擇的被動抗輻射求職者，X-波段雷達設計的家。這種導彈的導引頭傳感器的多樣性提供了一個優勢的蘇-35S。
簽名曝光：這是一個因素，主要影響JSF，有“吃豆子”在X-波段雷達橫截面，一個低可探測性“缺口”在前面。因為它演習，它可以打開缺口，從飛機上搜索傳感器，並公開了一個更高的雷達反射截面，搜索，或公開舷側或后側方另一架飛機。 F-35依靠一個“看不到我，也不能殺了我的能力，在傳播更多的損失，機動比蘇-35S，這一般會檢測到JSF大部分參與參與。此接觸可發生在，例如，當在JSF引導導彈和去減少封閉率，由此暴露飛機，並傳入導彈較長的范圍檢測，或者檢測從廣泛隔開的僚機。由于JSF的生存依賴于簽名減少，它有更多的失去其標志性的增加，因此更容易受到評估在一個多船，網絡化的動態變化，轉向參與簽名的管理是非常困難的。
殘局電子對抗（ECM）：“操作手法”的隱形飛機是輻射，輻射回報，這是ECM對策工作。蘇-35S ECM，JSF沒有，除了預期的AESA雷達干擾模式，在有限的前進約120度錐。 ECM數字射頻存儲器（DRFM）的基礎上，可以非常有效的，尤其是對有限的處理能力和時間來解決目標的導彈。蘇-35S也有几個ECM模式。 JSF被評為自卑，因為它不使用ECM打敗攻擊。
拖曳式誘餌/焦距：蘇-35S的，部署拖曳式誘餌，引誘閉幕導彈從身体的飛機可以選擇。 JSF的方法是不同的，小的Gen-X“主動誘餌發射導彈關閉。這些措施被評估為大致相等，在合作速度到目標可能呈現更有效的對策與拖曳式誘餌。
耀斑和箔條：這些都是過時的對策，但仍添加到引導導彈的機身靠近的難度。 GSh-301型聲稱有輪，火糠的飛機，所以在閉幕式的糠歧視處理導彈可能被欺騙。然而，相應的對策評定為等同。
馬赫一尾大通/加力燃油儲備為：在一段時間，在戰斗中，一架飛機離開，例如，當“溫徹斯特”或彈藥，或“賓果”或下降到只有足夠的燃料回家。然后，戰斗變成了尾追逐。蘇-35S具有較高的馬赫數可以關閉一個JSF，相反的是情況並非如此。蘇-35S的能力，攜帶大量的燃油，和巨大的消費JSF的F135發動機，最大加力的JSF加劇了這種危險的情況。它的優點是在這些方面進行戰斗，當JSF正試圖脫離了與蘇-35S。
脫離接觸：這是未來空戰根據評估的地區之一。當導彈的范圍大致相當于被解雇，他們的旅行超過100秒的目標。運輸時間提供了一個機會，為打敗攻擊的對策。導彈機動發射耀斑密集，難以隱藏的紅外線傳感器，所以在許多訂婚，將來襲導彈的預警。活躍的探子“光”，在約10海里的目標，仍然提供了寶貴的預警時間。這里是一個范圍脫離接觸措施：
機身敏捷：警告，一經推出后，有時擊敗衛冕飛機的攻擊，迅速轉身離開，以强制導彈的尾追逐。
AESA雷達天線覆蓋范圍：從一個固定的背板覆蓋約120度的圓錐体，如JSF APG-81的工作。蘇-35S歐空局的雷達工作從万向斜板“，占地約240度左右的鼻子，還有第二個雷達中的”毒刺“雖然用更少的能力，以補足其余的領域。如果蘇-35S和JSF火的超視距導彈在同一時間，在最大范圍內，蘇-35S可以轉走斷了線的連接兩個飛機到大約120度，，而JSF被限制在60度左右。這將運行到JSF的蘇-35S的導彈，而蘇-35S是從JSF的導彈。結果可能是一個RVV-SD命中的AIM-120的小姐。在這方面點的蘇-35S。
馬赫加力燃燒室出口/燃料儲備：這是一個擴展的天線覆蓋能力，為蘇-35S可加速遠離來襲導彈，迫使它放棄短。 JSF不會有這樣的表現，被評為劣。
消滅：
導彈的導引頭多樣性：在終端階段的參與，有可能是在附近的數枚導彈，飛機機動打敗攻擊。來襲導彈的紅外導引頭，可能會顯示“后端”的JSF和跟蹤的殺。這個機會是不是提供給JSF蘇-35S的攻擊，因為其有限的導彈架不包括超視距導彈與IR求職者。
導彈敏捷：這是“側空翻”飛機的敏捷性。 R-77有著名的“馬鈴薯搗碎的格子尾操縱面，同時提高比傳統的表面拖動，也給終端操縱能力。因此，蘇-35S超視距武器可以出轉F-35的武器。
彈頭殺傷力：這是一個混合彈頭的破壞力和目標機体的脆弱性。 AIM-120D具有一個18公斤的破片殺傷戰斗部，和分布廣泛的蘇-35S裝甲引擎，裝甲部分的機身和系統冗余的。 R-77導彈有30公斤擴張杆彈頭摧毀的單引擎JSF，滅火的關鍵系統，如已被刪除，以降低重量和成本。被評定為卓越的蘇-35S。
WVR導彈：這是簡單的“蘇-35S進行WVR導彈，JSF不”（在這個例子中）。 JSF可以進行WVR導彈，但它們是外部安裝，損害雷達信號。
槍殺傷力越大越好。超過25毫米炮彈，30毫米子彈的爆發力。同樣，在機身的脆弱性是一個問題，一個30毫米命中JSF的單引擎可以將其關閉。
殺鏈的末端，它似乎從表面上看，蘇-35S的所有“正確的東西”空戰，F-35 JSF沒有。這應該是毫不奇怪，因為設計簡短的JSF F-22A將“常清潔”領空和提供空中優勢，使之成為安全的聯合攻擊戰斗機提供后續打擊能力。
現在的F-22A“猛禽程序終止時沒有足夠的飛機提供空中優勢，現在這個角色被分配到F-35 JSF。
鑒于OSD采用的空中優勢戰斗機F-35聯合攻擊戰斗機的意圖，根本沒有答案的問題是：
后記：請不要提PAK-FA。...<div class='locked'><em>瀏覽完整內容，請先 <a href='member.php?mod=register'>註冊</a> 或 <a href='javascript:;' onclick="lsSubmit()">登入會員</a></em></div> f-35先天就是小su-35一號
能帶的航電系統
當然會有一小段差距
而武器酬載就................... 既然都這樣比了怎麼不拉MIG-35進來比{:46:}
除了要避免停刊的某雜誌外，一般認定第五代戰機首要就是匿蹤，而且是兼顧氣動的匿蹤，其他想扯另外甚麼S開頭的英文字就各自發揮{:45:}
SU-35不具匿蹤外型，在視距外就已經掛了...所以單比較R-77和AIM120沒意義
感覺這篇文太過貶低F-35並且太過吹捧SU-35了
如果SU-35這麼強，那PAK-FA不就稱霸地球了=>顯然沒有{:31:} 本帖最後由 toko1114 於 2013-4-4 01:11 AM 編輯
uskz 發表於 2013-4-4 12:17 AM
下面是GOOGLE的英譯中， 請參考。
資料來源：澳大利亞空中力量
有點像是google翻譯的哩
我冏
不過還是感謝你
話說兩種35我是比較看好SU
<br><br><br><br><br><div></div> 本帖最後由 248836c 於 2013-4-4 05:48 AM 編輯
雖然要買Su35s 中國作為買家當然喜歡聽人好話
但是誰比較强 基本就不用討論了能打得贏陣風 中共就算賺到了
貘良了 發表於 2013-4-4 12:58 AM static/image/common/back.gif
既然都這樣比了怎麼不拉MIG-35進來比
除了要避免停刊的某雜誌外，一般認定第五代戰機首要就是匿蹤， ...
匿蹤不是無敵，尤其是某機的雷達匿蹤只是正前方的很狹窄的角度 {:46:}
超視距戰的決定性因素還有飛機的進入速度、高度等對飛彈的動位能加乘，不知為什麼總被某些媒體完全忽略 {:3:}...<div class='locked'><em>瀏覽完整內容，請先 <a href='member.php?mod=register'>註冊</a> 或 <a href='javascript:;' onclick="lsSubmit()">登入會員</a></em></div> 謝謝大大分享，澳洲是想做什麼，難度不準備跟美國混了？ 兩款當初的設計觀點不一樣吧，這樣要怎麼比較?況且都是軍火貿易國的產品，當然會為自己的產品助陣加分囉，哪有可能唱衰自己的產品?對外銷武器系統又沒有幫助 貘良了 發表於 2013-4-4 12:58 AM static/image/common/back.gif
既然都這樣比了怎麼不拉MIG-35進來比
除了要避免停刊的某雜誌外，一般認定第五代戰機首要就是匿蹤， ...
因為淺在威脅國沒有裝備MIG-35，F35也就只有匿蹤贏四代半戰機，視距外打擊要把不可逃逸區算進去，視距外對上高推重比高機動戰機沒那麼好用{:34:}...<div class='locked'><em>瀏覽完整內容，請先 <a href='member.php?mod=register'>註冊</a> 或 <a href='javascript:;' onclick="lsSubmit()">登入會員</a></em></div><br><br><br><br><br><div></div>